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Case No. 920302-CA

Priority 16

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2
(Utah 1984) / Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992), and Rule
42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1992).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes and rules are relevant to the
determination of this case:
Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(3) (1984):
If the final determination of the executive director is
consistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law
recommended by the hearing officer, the court shall review
the record and may alter the final determination only upon a
1

This appeal is not governed by the Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46(b)-l to 63-46(b)-22.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 (1984), the 1986 petition
came before the District Court on appeal rather than as a trial
de novo.

1

finding that the final determination is capricious, or not
supported by the evidence.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b)(Emphasis added):
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rule or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After
the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a
jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence the
defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a
dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as the
trier of the facts may then determine them and render
judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If the court
renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless
the court otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule,
other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication of the merits.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion by

dismissing Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc.'s ("Country
Meadows") appeal, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, for failure to prosecute where Country Meadows
made no efforts to move the appeal forward for a period exceeding
five years?
2.

Did the trial court lack jurisdiction to consider the

merits of a motion for summary judgment once the case was
dismissed for failure to prosecute?

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Point I involves the trial court's discretion in

dismissing a case for failure to prosecute. Wilson v. Lambert,
613 P.2d 765 (Utah 1980); Charlie Brown Constr. v. Leisure
Sports, Inc., 740 P. 2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987).

A party

challenging a District Court's ruling must show that "it is clear
from the record that [the trial court] abused its discretion."
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
2.

Point II involves a question of law concerning the

court's continuing jurisdiction after dismissal; thus, a
correction-of-error standard applies, with no deference accorded
to the lower court's ruling.

State, Dept. of Social Services v.

Vilil, 784 P. 2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a case to determine

whether the District Court correctly dismissed Country Meadows'
appeal for failure to prosecute and whether the District Court
erred when it subsequently granted the Division of Health Care
Financing's Motion for Summary Judgment.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Prior to July 1981, nursing

homes operating in the State of Utah received Medicaid

i

reimbursement on a cost-by-cost basis2 and various other
factors.

Since the reimbursement standards frequently changed

during this pre-1981 period, nursing homes in Utah were required
to maintain accurate expense records and file extensive cost
reports to be reviewed by the Division of Health Care Financing,
Utah Department of Health, the designated agency responsible for
administering Utah's Medicaid program.

R. 712.

For the reporting period from September 3, 1978 to June 30
1979, Country Meadows, an Ogden, Utah, nursing home, requested
reimbursement for costs incurred by C.W. Barney, Inc. for the
construction of the nursing home.

These construction costs

included a 10% contractor's fee.

R. 3, 18. The Division of

Health Care Financing, however, determined that, pursuant to
Federal Medicaid Regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 405.427 ("§ 427" ), 3

2

After 1981, Congress passed an amendment to 42 C.F.R §
405.427, known as the Boren Amendment, which required nursing
homes to be reimbursed on the basis of a flat rate methodology
and not a cost-by-cost basis.
3

42 C.F.R. § 405.427 is a federal regulation relating to
the rate of reimbursement for expenses incurred in the
construction and operation of facilities that service Medicaid
recipients. Under § 427, costs applicable to related entities
are included within the reimbursement only to the extent that
they reflect actual costs to the related organization. Under §
427, related "means that the provider to a significant extent is
associated or affiliated with or has control of or is controlled
by the organization furnishing the services." 42 C.F.R. §
405.427(b)(1) (1984).

4

C.W. Barney, Inc. and Country Meadows were deemed "related
entities" and therefore entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for
the costs of nursing home construction only.

The application of

this regulation therefore disqualified Country Meadows' request
for the additional contractor's fee in the amount of $38,344.00.
R. 15, 17-18, 276.

Specifically, the Division found that Carl

Barney was not only the nursing home contractor, but also that
Carl Barney held a substantial interest in Country Meadows.

R.

17-18.
On September 3, 1983, Country Meadows sent a letter to the
Division requesting an appeal of the Division's original audit.
R. 277.

On February 24, 1984, following several informal

conferences between Country Meadows and the Division, Country
Meadows requested that a formal hearing be conducted pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S 26-23-2(1), which states in pertinent part:
"If the matter cannot be resolved at the informal hearing, the
aggrieved person may then request a hearing before an impartial
hearing officer appointed by the department . . .."
Ann. (1984).

R. 4, 72-73.

Utah Code

On July 9, 1985, a formal hearing was

held before Robert M. Archuletta, Esq., an administrative law
judge for the Department of Health.
represented by counsel.

R. 9.

Both parties were

R. 9.

On February 26, 1986, the hearing officer rendered a

5

preliminary decision and order and affirmed the Division's
position that Country Meadows was not eligible for the
contractor's fee based on the following findings:

1) Carl W.

Barney, Inc., was related to the provider Country Meadows
Convalescent Center to a significant extent by possessing
significant ownership or equity in the provider through C.W.
Barney, Inc., which built the facility.

R. 41; 2) Carl W.

Barney, Jr., had the power to control the bid price and overhead.
R. 41; 3) Carl W. Barney, Jr.,, through his close business
partnership with Eva S. Barney, exercised power to reduce
competition for construction of Country Meadows and, by so doing,
Country Meadows in effect obtained the construction of the
facility for itself.

R. 41; and 4) Eva S. Barney never sought

nor received any other construction bids for Country Meadows
while there was a potentially open, competitive market.

R. 41.

On March 27, 1986, Dr. Suzanne Dandoy, Executive Director,
Utah Department of Health, ("Executive Director"), remanded the
hearing officer's decision on the grounds that the hearing
officer had incorrectly applied an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review rather than the correct "preponderance of
evidence" standard required at such hearings.

R. 45.

On June 4, 1986, the hearing officer then rendered an
Amended Recommended Decision which applied the correct standard

6

and affirmed the previous findings of the Recommended Decision
and Order of February 26, 1986. R. 47-50. On June 12, 1986, the
Executive Director affirmed the amended decision and entered a
final determination in favor of the Division's denial of the
contractor's fee.

R. 52.

On July 11, 1986, Country Meadows sought judicial review of
the final decision and filed a Petition for Review before the
Third District Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2(2)
(1984).

R. 2.

On August 4, 1986, the Division filed its Answer

to Country Meadows' Petition for Review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 26-23-2(2) (1984).

R.

62-65.

The record in the instant case reveals that no further
action was taken in this case by Country Meadows for a period of
over five years.

Consequently, on December 17, 1991, the

Division of Health Care Financing filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to Prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

R. 704-713.

On December 30, 1991 Country Meadows filed a Motion in
Opposition to the Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Prosecute.4

R. 714-720.

On January 7, 1992, Country Meadows

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that hearing officer
* This represents the only action taken by Country Meadows
in furtherance of this appeal since the initial filing of Country
Meadow's Petition for Review in July 1986.
7

had erred in its ruling.

R. 730-800.

On January 21, 1992, the

Division filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that
there was no material issue of fact upon which Country Meadows
could claim relief.

R. 808-822.

On February 3, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge Dennis
Frederick in the Third District Court.

R. 824.

Following

argument from both sides, the trial court granted the Division's
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and the Division's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

R.

Country Meadows brought this appeal.

824.

On March 13, 1992

R. 832-834.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On February 15, 1978, Eva S. Barney ("Mrs. Barney") and her
son, Carl W. Barney, a general contractor and sole owner of C.W.
Barney, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, ("Carl"), entered into a
partnership, known as Country Meadows Convalescent Center, Inc.,
to build and operate a nursing home known as Country Meadows.
11-12.

R.

Appellant, Country Meadows, is a nursing home located in

Ogden, Utah, which provides intermediate and skilled nursing care
to Medicaid recipients.

R. 3.

The circumstances giving rise to

this appeal occurred between September 3, 1978 and June 30, 1979,
a period of more than 14 years ago, and relate to a claim by
Country Meadows involving Medicaid reimbursement for the
construction costs for a new facility owned by Country Meadows.

8

R. 11-15.

Pursuant to the terms of their partnership, Mrs.

Barney contributed the land for the nursing home and held a 20%
interest in the partnership.

R.

13. Carl contributed

$176,000.00 in up-front costs and received an 80% interest in the
partnership of this new nursing home.

R. 13.

Construction of Country Meadows was pursuant to a contract
agreement that stated that Carl would receive the costs of the
construction, plus a 10% contractor's fee.

R. 15. While some

preliminary estimates were received, neither Mrs. Barney nor the
partnership solicited outside bids to compare the projected costs
of construction.5

R. 14, 41, 160-162. At all times during the

partnership, it was understood that Carl would perform all of the
construction for the nursing home.

R. 14.

before the hearing officer, Carl stated:
assumed we were the best for the job.
in my mind we would do it."

In his testimony

"I guess I always

There was never any doubt

R. 14. On September 3, 1978 the

facility opened under the name Country Meadows Convalescent
Center.

R. 16. At that time, Carl was named facility

5

The fact that Barney did not solicit nor consider any
outside bids is significant in that it points directly to the
relationship between the partnership (Country Meadows) and the
contractor (C.W. Barney, Inc.). In its reimbursement scheme, §
427 will only allow those costs to the related organization which
are actually incurred and which do not exceed the price of
comparable services, facilities, or supplies by alternative
entities. 42 C.F.R. S 405.427 (1984).
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administrator and the prior partnership agreement was reformed in
the State of Delaware as a corporation with Carl and Mrs. Barney
maintaining primary ownership.

R. 17.

Pursuant to Country Meadows' request for reimbursement for
construction costs associated with the nursing home, the Division
of Health Care Financing denied the contractor's fee in the
amount of $38,344.00, in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 405.427. R.
18.

That amount reflected the 10% contractor's fee which Mrs.

Barney and Carl had agreed to in their contract.
The Executive Director for the Department of Health affirmed
the Division of Health Care Financing's decision that Country
Meadows and C.W. Barney, Inc. were "related entities" under
relevant federal Medicaid regulations and were therefore
ineligible to receive reimbursement for the 10% contractor's fee.
R. 764, 787, 796, 798. On July 11, 1986, Country Meadows filed
an appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 26-23-2 (1984) in the
Third District Court.

R.

2.

From August 4, 1986, when the Division of Health Care
Financing filed its Answer to Country Meadow's Petition of Review
to December 17, 1991, when the Division filed a Motion to Dismiss
For Failure to Prosecute, there were no attempts made by Country
Meadows to move its appeal forward pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
26-23-2 (1984).

R. 706.

10

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing Country Meadows' appeal for failure to prosecute
pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, where
Country Meadows made no efforts to move its appeal forward for a
period exceeding five years.

The duty to prosecute is a duty of

due diligence imposed upon plaintiff, not defendant.

Country

Meadows offers no credible explanation or justifiable excuse for
its dilatory conduct throughout the dormancy of its case.

Even

after receiving the 1988 letter from the Division relating to
subsequent reimbursement questions, Country Meadows failed to
prosecute its pending appeal.

Therefore, the trial court

coreectly dismissed Country Meadows' appeal in light of its
inexcusable neglect.
Furthermore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the merits of the Division's Motion for Summary Judgment once
Country Meadows' appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Dismissal acts as a termination of the case and voids a court's
continuing jurisdiction to rule on pending matters.

Thus, the

trial court's subsequent order granting the Division's Motion for
Summary Judgment should be vacated.

11

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING COUNTRY MEADOWS' APPEAL FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b).
On December 17, 1991, the Division of Health Care Financing
filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.

On February

3, 1992, the district court granted the Division's Motion to
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Country Meadows argues that the trial judge erred in granting the
Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on two
grounds:

(1) that it was incumbent on the Division, not Country

Meadows, to move this appeal forward; and (2) that dismissal
would substantially prejudice it in light of subsequent Medicaid
reimbursement issues involving the nursing home for FY's 1980 and
1981.

However, a review of the record in the instant case and

relevant case law conclusively shows that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in granting the Division's Motion to Dismiss
in light of the dormancy of this matter over a protracted period
of time.
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in
pertinent part:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute . . . a defendant
may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him . . . Unless the court in its order for dismissal
12

otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
. operates as an adjudication on the merits.

..

A dismissal for failure to prosecute will not be overturned
unless "it is clear from the record that [the trial court] abused
its discretion."
Ct. App. 1989).

Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d 237, 239 (Utah
In order to establish such an abuse of

discretion, a party must demonstrate not only a "justifiable
excuse," but also point to conduct by both parties which
invalidates the finding of failure to prosecute. Id. at 239.
The duty to prosecute with reasonable diligence is a duty
imposed upon the plaintiff, not the defendant.

As this Court has

noted, affirming the dismissal of a plaintiff's case after three
years of dilatory conduct:

"The burden is on the plaintiff to

prosecute a case in due course without unusual or unreasonable
delay.

Plaintiffs are required to 'prosecute their claims with

due diligence, or accept the penalty of dismissal.'"

Charlie

Brown Constr., Inc. v. Leisure Sports > Inc., 740 P. 2d 1368, 1370
(Utah 1987) (quoting Maxfield v Fishier, 538 P. 2d 1323, 1325
(Utah 1975)); Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 239.

The court

in Charlie Brown ruled that where plaintiff had repeatedly
forestalled prosecution of its case through stipulations and
continuances, plaintiff failed to meet its burden and therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing for
lack of prosecution.
13

In the instant case, Country Meadows took no affirmative
steps to move its appeal forward.

On July 11, 1986, Country

Meadows filed its original appeal in the Third District Court.
After Country Meadows filed the appeal, it lay dormant for five
and one-half years until the Division of Health Care Financing
filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute on December
17, 1991.

Country Meadows offers no valid explanation or excuse

for this delay.

Country Meadows inexcusably neglected its duty

of "due diligence" to prosecute its appeal as the moving party,
and thus must be willing to accept the dismissal of its action.
In ruling on a motion for dismissal for failure to
prosecute, a trial court must examine:
(1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity
each has dad ot move the case forward; (3) what each of
the parties have done to move the case forward; (4)
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to
the other side; and (5) most important, whether
injustice may result of the dismissal;
K.L.C. Inc. v, McLean, 656 P. 2d 986, 988 (Utah 1982) (citing
Westinahouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W, Larsen Contractor.
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)).

In Westinahouse, the Utah

Supreme Court stated that:
a trial court should have reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move forward • • . without justifiable
excuse . . .[w]hether there is such a justifiable
excuse is to be determined by considering more factors
than merely the length of time since the suit was
filed.
14

Westincrhouse, 544 P. 2d at 878-79.
Country Meadows points to only two reasons why this Court
should reverse Judge Frederick's ruling.

First, it relies on a

letter of June 8, 1988, from Kent Roner, Director of the Bureau
of Financial Services, Division of Health Care Financing, Utah
Department of Health, in which Roner recommended that Country
Meadows not move forward on any subsequent

matters concerning

Medicaid reimbursement until resolution of its pending appeal of
its 1979 claims.
subsequent

Country Meadows contends only that these

reimbursement questions would be "substantially

impacted" by the lower court's dismissal of this action.
Second, without offering any excuse for its delay or its refusal
to prosecute the instant claims, Country Meadows states that the
Division of Health Care Financing should have moved the case
forward itself.

Both explanations, however, fall far short of

the showing of justifiable excuse under the test enunciated in
Westinqhouse.

In short, Country Meadows' conduct is inexcusable

and Judge Frederick was well within his discretion when he
dismissed this appeal.
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P. 2d at 240, the Court ruled
that a plaintiff's dilatory conduct in failing to prosecute
strongly outweighs any inaction on the part of the defendant.
The Court found that despite a flurry of activity from the

15

plaintiff over a period of seven years, plaintiff Maxfield never
exhibited a readiness to move toward trial. Id.

The Court

pointed out, that although the defendant forestalled litigation
for a period of eighteen months —
was also unable to proceed —

during which time plaintiff

the defendant had at all time

expressed a willingness to proceed.

Id.

The Court found that

the defendant, not the plaintiff, would be substantially
prejudiced if the dismissal for failure to prosecute were not
upheld, since nine years had passed since the incident occurred
and much of its evidence was no longer available.

.Id., at 240-41.

In Maxfield, the Court then rejected plaintiff's argument
that it too would suffer prejudice.

The Maxfield Court stated

that the plaintiff "had more than ample opportunity to prove his
asserted interest and simply failed to do so.
inexcusable."

Such nonaction is

Id. at 240.

In the instant case, Country Meadows not only had the duty
to prosecute its appeal, but also had ample opportunity to
advance its claims against the Division of Health Care Financing•
It simply failed to act for a period in excess of five years.
Country Meadows did not seek to join in any settlement
discussion, it filed no motions and it made no indications that
it was prepared to proceed with its appeal. After five years of
this unexplained delay, Country Meadows filed a Motion in

if

Opposition and Motion for Summary Judgment only after the
Division initiated steps to resolve this matter.

These factors

clearly establish that Country Meadows' failure to prosecute was
caused by its inexcusable neglect.
In citing the 1988 Roner letter, Country Meadows merely
attempts to divert attention away from its own inexcusable
conduct.

A simple review of the Roner letter shows that this

letter should have prompted Country Meadows to move forward with
its district court appeal in order to resolve its outstanding
Medicaid reimbursement for subsequent years.

Thus, Country

Meadows cannot use this correspondence from Mr. Roner to
establish that either the Division failed to act or that the
Division discouraged Country Meadows from prosecuting its pending
appeal.

On the contrary, the Roner letter is further evidence of

Country Meadows' inexcusable neglect.
Country Meadows insists that it was the Division of Health
Care Financing's obligation to move the case forward and that the
Division forestalled furtherance of the appeal.

Country Meadows

believes that the Division of Health Care Financing should have
filed an Order to Show Cause or conducted additional exit
conferences with Country Meadows regarding these 1979 claims for
reimbursement.

Further, Country Meadows contends that the

Division should have pursued further review of several matters

17

which not resolved in its favor during the administrative
hearing.

However, viewing the formal hearing decision in its

entirety, the Division was satisfied with the outcome of the
hearing and never filed a petition for review in district court.
Therefore, it is clear that Country Meadows' neglect in
prosecuting this action is inexcusable.
In Westinahouse, the court stated that "it is . . .
important to keep in mind that the very reason for the existence
of courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and
to do justice between them."

Westinahouse, 544 P.2d at 879. The

possibility of injustice is the most important factor in
reviewing a claim that the trial judge abused his discretion. Id.
Country Meadows had an "opportunity to be heard and to do
justice,"
1985.

during its formal administrative hearing on July 9,

Country Meadows has been granted an opportunity to present

its evidence and have its case decided on the merits.
Meadows' lack of "due diligence"

Country

not the actions of either

the Division or the decision of the trial judge dismissing this
action

thwarted its opportunity for further judicial review.

Therefore, Country Meadows will not be substantially prejudiced
if this Court upholds the lower court's ruling of dismissal.
By contrast, the Division of Health Care Financing would be
substantially prejudiced if Judge Frederick's dismissal for

18

failure to prosecute is overturned.

In 1981, Congress

dramatically changed the methodology by which nursing homes
receive Medicaid reimbursement.

This case by Country Meadows

represents the only remaining case under the pre-1981
reimbursement methodology.

The Division on Health Care Financing

maintained accurate records during the administrative proceedings
and continued to maintain these records until at least 1988. Had
Country Meadows proceeded with its appeal, the Division would
have retained all the necessary records to move forward with this
appeal.

If the dismissal were overturned, the Division would be

unable to accurately determine the rate or reimbursement that
Country Meadows should receive under the pre-1981 formula.
Country Meadows' delay in prosecution has substantially
prejudiced the Division's ability to defend its actions.
Further, Country Meadows relies on Department of Social
Services v. Romero, 609 P. 2d 1323 (Utah 1980) in support of its
claim that its failure to proceed should be justified by the
Division's purported failure to act.

Romero is easily

distinguished on its particular facts, however.

In Romero, the

court ruled that the lower court abused its discretion when it
granted defendant's motion to dismiss for plaintiff's failure to
prosecute.

The court stated that it was the "totality of the

circumstances,f which determined the proper grounds for dismissal.
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Romero, 609 P. 2d at 1324.
In reversing the lower court's dismissal, the court,
however, pointed to the fact that the defendant, a fraudulent
welfare recipient, actually benefited by and was perfectly
content with plaintiff's delay in prosecution.

The Romero court

found that the trial judge had not properly considered the
defendant's role in the delay and determined that both parties
had equal opportunity to move the case forward.

Id. at 1323-24.

In determining that the lower court had abused its discretion,
the court stated that the defendant was apprised of the trial
date and that he made no effort to ascertain the cause of the
delay.

More importantly, the court determined that the defendant

was in no way harmed by the delay and that it would be unfair to
allow defendant to sit silently by and then "attempt[ing] to
blame the other party for the delay as a means of escaping the
effects of a judgment based on . . . misrepresentation and
cheating."

Id. at 1324.

Nothing in Romero either validates or mitigates Country
Meadows' failure to prosecute in the instant case.

Here, a State

agency's decision to limit Medicaid reimbursement to a nursing
home had already been adjudicated by an impartial hearing officer
and upheld.

The Division was satisfied with this ruling and, in

fact, contacted Country Meadows in 1988 explaining that no
20

subsequent action should be taken on Country Meadows' requests
for additional reimbursement until resolution of its appeal.
Unlike Romero. the Division would be adversely affected if this
Court rewards Country Meadows' inexcusable neglect.
Country Meadows has failed to show that its failure to
prosecute for a protracted period was justified and has failed to
show any abuse of discretion by the trial court.

Therefore,

Judge Frederick's order of dismissal for failure to prosecute
should be affirmed.
POINT II
JUDGE FREDERICK'S ORDER GRANTING THE DIVISION'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS VOID FOR
LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Following Judge Frederick's dismissal of Country Meadows'
appeal for failure to prosecute, the Court granted the Division
of Health Care Financing's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
However, the Court was without jurisdiction at that juncture of
the proceedings to rule on any subsequent matters.
Issues of jurisdiction are questions of law and therefore a
correction of error standard applies with no deference accorded
the lower court's ruling.

State Dept. of Social Services v.

Villi. 784 P. 2d 1130# 1132 (Utah 1989).
In Power Train, Inc. v Stuver, 550 P. 2d 1293 (Utah 1976),
the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
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,f

A dismissal not only

postpones the action as a stay might have done, it discontinues
the complaint completely, so an entirely new suit must be
instituted to bring the cause before the court again."
1294.

J^i. at

In Power Train, the court overturned a dismissal of a

securities action on the grounds that a stay should have been
issued until a simultaneous action in California was resolved.
In the instant case, a stay is not what was requested by the
Division, nor would it have served any logical purpose in light
of the long delay caused by Country Meadows' inaction.

The

dismissal by the district court, in the instant case, did just
that

it discontinued the case and the district court lacked

jurisdiction to review any and all other matters before it.
Indeed, following the dismissal, Country Meadows would have been
required to file a new claim to have any other substantive or
procedural motions considered by the court.
In Keenan Pipe & Supply Co. v. Superior Court of County of
Pima, 383 P. 2d 864 (Ariz. 1963), the Arizona Supreme Court
determined that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue
an Order to Show Cause and other substantive orders once the
court had dismissed the action.

Quoting the general rule

established in Smurda v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
266 P. 843, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928), the court stated:
f

[T]he effect of a dismissal . . . is ipso facto to
terminate the case and oust the court of jurisdiction
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to proceed.
It follows that, although the court had previously
possessed jurisdiction over the persons and the
subject-matter of the suit in question, such
jurisdiction had been completely lost. Hence the
judgment rendered and all other steps taken
subsequently to the dismissal of the action are void
for want of jurisdiction.'
Keenan, 383 P. 2d at 866.
Further, in the case of Love v. Rocky Mountain Kennel Club,
514 P. 2d 336 (Colo. App. 1973), the Colorado Court of Appeals
stated that "a dismissal . . . for failure to prosecute is a
final order."

Id. at 337

The court ruled that where the

plaintiff had made an untimely motion to reinstate its case
following the court's dismissal, "the trial court was without
authority to reinstate the case or to provide further relief."
Id.

Similarly, Judge Frederick lacked the authority to grant the

Division's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment after he had
dismissed the action based on Country Meadows' failure to
prosecute.

That dismissal terminated the court's authority and

jurisdiction over the matter.
A court may grant attorney's fees concurrent with an order
of dismissal, but lacks jurisdiction to act following
of the order.
Ct. App. 1973),

the entry

In Crawford v. Crawford, 514 P. 2d 1050, (Ariz.
the court stated that "where a party has been

dismissed, . . . he may not thereafter apply for relief based on
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that suit since the court no longer has jurisdiction to enter
that relief."

JEd. at 1051. However, "attorney's fees may be

included in the order of dismissal, at the [cjourt's discretion."
Id.

Where the Division's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment was

not ruled upon until after dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal,
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on any subsequent
matters.
It is clear that the district court granted the Division's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment only after it had granted the
Division's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute.

The court

was without jurisdiction to proceed on any further matters
following the dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal.6 Thus,
Judge Frederick's order granting summary judgment is void for
lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the
lower court's dismissal of Country Meadows' appeal and vacate

6

If this Court were to overturn Judge Frederick's
dismissal order, the only other appropriate relief would be
remand of the case for further proceedings.
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Judge Frederick's subsequent order granting the Division's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment.
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